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I. INTRODUCTION
If one were to ask today in business and financial circles what has been, five
years after its passage, the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-
Oxley”)1 on the regulation of public corporations, one would be greeted by a lit-
any of complaints and doomsday predictions.  The legislation is now perceived as
a media-driven congressional overreaction to a few salient corporate scandals (as
opposed to a rational legal reform governed by hard-edged empirical analysis),
which ended up imposing costs on U.S. public corporations that exceeded the ben-
efits that the regulations attempted to create.2  According to this view, Sarbanes-
Oxley has had unintended, but predictable, consequences.  To avoid its heavy
regulatory burdens, foreign companies have been reluctant to list their securities
in the United States, and domestic public companies have been forced into the
private market.3  According to the prevailing view, the legislation designed to
protect the U.S. public capital markets ironically ended up contributing to their
demise.  The message from this perspective is that it is necessary to repeal or
weaken the legislation before it is too late—that is, before the public capital mar-
kets atrophy and before the United States loses its dominant position as the
world’s center of finance.4
There is, however, another perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley.5  The history of
modern U.S. business can be seen as one of occasional overreaching by the mana-
gerial and financial elite in public companies and the financial markets.6  Mem-
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).  Sarbanes-Oxley is the federal act passed by Congress to address the corporate
scandals of the late-1990s and early-2000s.  It primarily amended the federal securities laws. See gener-
ally Press Release, SEC, Summary of SEC Actions and SEC Related Provisions Pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (July 30, 2003).  For my other writings about Sarbanes-Oxley and for cita-
tions to other scholarship on the act, see James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Coun-
tering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 Or. L. Rev. 435, 478 n.137 (2004) [hereinafter Fanto,
Whistleblowing]. See also JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY §§ 3-1–3-88 (2d
ed. 2006) [hereinafter FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY].
2. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE
LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT (2006); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 (2005).
3. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 5 (2006); SUSTAINING NEW
YORK’S AND THE U.S.’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 13–17 (2007) (commissioned by New
York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and Senator Charles E. Schumer); U.S. CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE, COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF THE U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6–7 (2007).
4. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 3, at 31–34; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULA-
TION, supra note 3, at 8.
5. For examples of positions supportive of Sarbanes-Oxley, see John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (2007); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Criticizing the Crit-
ics: Sarbanes-Oxley and Quack Corporate Governance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. (2006); Craig Doidge et
al., Has New York Become Less Competitive in Global Markets?  Evaluating Foreign Listings over
Time (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2007-03-012, 2007), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=982193.
6. See generally CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE FALL OF
ENRON (2004). There are, of course, other perspectives that can coexist with this perspective, such as that
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bers of this elite are checked in their misconduct by competitors and held back by
social norms that, if necessary, are enforced by market regulators and prosecutors
as representatives of society.  The creation of new wealth available for distribu-
tion often leads to overreaching by members of the elite, a phenomenon that gen-
erally occurs in what financial scholars call a “bubble.”7  In a bubble, members of
the elite violate social and legal restraints, often resulting in criminal prosecution
and regulatory action in the short term and legislation or regulation that ad-
dresses the specific abuses in the long term.
This perspective makes sense of Sarbanes-Oxley.  The pre-Sarbanes-Oxley
period was one in which, because of the Internet, new technology companies
emerged with promises of tremendous growth and huge amounts of wealth to be
made.8  Funds flowed freely to these companies, although only a few ever deliv-
ered on their promises.  It was a classic bubble period.  Company founders, corpo-
rate executives, venture capital investors, and investment bankers, who helped
take these companies public, in addition to accountants, lawyers, and even lay
people, were affected by the “gold rush” environment.  The Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”) even went so far as to issue warnings meant for the
many novice day traders.9
The promises of great wealth overwhelmed social checks, informal codes of
conduct, and even legal restraints, in the single-minded pursuit of self-interest.
Investment and commercial bankers alike began to engage in such questionable
practices as abandoning longstanding client relationships, switching allegiances to
other companies to obtain higher fees, and acquiring future business by allocating
shares of “hot” initial public offerings (“IPOs”) to executives of prospective cli-
ents.10  Some large public companies that had become successful during this pe-
riod, like Enron, perverted the rules of capitalism altogether when they raised
this elite’s activity is primarily beneficial for all of society. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW
FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2003) (extolling the virtues and inventions of modern
finance).
7. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES
16 (4th ed. 2000) (“[A] bubble is an upward price movement over an extended range that then im-
plodes.”).  Kindleberger explains how the bubble can be formed by excessive speculation in assets, an over-
estimation in their value, and excessive lending to purchase the assets. Id. at 16–17.  These situations
remind me of the scene in a documentary where Jane Goodall introduces numerous bunches of bananas to
the chimpanzees that she is studying in her African wildlife refuge of Gombi.  The chimps go crazy and
become insanely aggressive when faced with this surfeit of bananas, and their surprisingly complex social
structure, which is highly dependent upon cooperation, collapses temporarily in a winner-take-all free-
for-all. See AMONG THE WILD CHIMPANZEES (National Geographic 1984).
8. For a brief discussion of this episode, see RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM
FROM THE CAPITALISTS 99–101 (2003).
9. See SEC, DAY TRADING: YOUR DOLLARS AT RISK, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/daytips.htm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2008).  Day trading is an activity whereby an investor buys and sells securities rapidly,
generally on a daily basis, to make quick profits from fluctuations in the prices of the securities. Id.
10. For a discussion of the changes in investment banking, which involved the demise of client-centered codes
of conduct for the unbridled pursuit of wealth, see JONATHAN A. KNEE, THE ACCIDENTAL INVESTMENT
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funds based upon a fraudulent view of their financial condition,11 and some com-
panies simply fabricated their financial results.12  This excessive pursuit of self-
interest was widespread.13  When the bubble burst with the NASDAQ crash of
200014 and the corporate scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, among others,
were revealed, public disapproval of the pursuit of self-interest by the elite could
finally be expressed.15  Since the overreaching by the elite was widespread, gov-
BANKER 171–87 (2006); PHILIP AUGAR, THE GREED MERCHANTS: HOW THE INVESTMENT BANKS
PLAYED THE FREE MARKET GAME 65-87 (2005).
11. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275,
1294–99 (2002).  In this article, Bratton shows that Enron moved poorly performing assets off its balance
sheet to special purpose entities and received funds from outside investors for these “sales,” but the company
guaranteed the investors a return based on the price of Enron stock, which was high because investors did
not realize that the sales were sham transactions.  Although Enron was originally an “old-line” pipeline
company, it had transformed itself to engage primarily in trading commodities, like oil and gas, and
derivative contracts on these commodities.  In a sense, Enron typified the “get rich quick” mentality of
executives operating in a bubble period, where individuals become more concerned with apparent, not
actual, results so long as the appearance can be translated into wealth for the individuals. See id.
12. This was the case with WorldCom.  When other telecommunications companies were struggling, it was
producing positive financial results by disguising its line costs as assets, which meant that these costs did
not reduce its income. See, e.g., Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses,
Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at A1; Jesse Drucker & Henny Sender,
Sorry, Wrong Number: Strategy Behind Accounting Scheme, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A9.
13. The evidence comes from the large number of restatements of financial statements by public companies in
the bubble years. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS:
TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES (2002) (summa-
rizing data on the increase in financial restatements in the period 1997–2001).  Indeed, the stock-option
backdating scandal, the facts of which are still emerging, took place during that period and is yet another
example of this misbehavior, involving, as it did, directors, chief executive officers, and other senior execu-
tives.  In this scandal, insiders gave as a reported grant date for executive stock options a date that was
earlier than the date of the actual grant so that the stock option would be immediately in the money when
awarded—that is, the executive would have an immediate gain.  This practice made a mockery of execu-
tive stock options, which were supposed to be incentive compensation and, thus, were supposed to convey
value to the executives if they increased the company’s value. See Sunil Panikkath et al., Options
Backdating: A Primer, Part I (Oct. 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), download available at http://
www.nera.com/\Publication.asp?p_ID=2935.
14. I refer to a significant decline in that year of the NASDAQ, which listed many of the Internet companies
that were revealed to be overpriced.  This decline led to an investigation of practices in the securities
industry dealing with IPOs of these companies and contributed to this overpricing. See, e.g., E.S.
Browning, Nasdaq Falls to Nearly 50% Below Record High—Earnings Warnings Push Index
Down 4%; Blue Chips Lose 2%, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2000, at C1.
15. Along with disapproval, the public expressed dismay at the incredible wealth loss suffered by those who
were holding the stock of overvalued or fraudulent companies when the music stopped. See, e.g., Alan
Murray, Twelve Angry CEOs—the Ideal Enron Jury, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A2 (“Between
1998 and 2000, total compensation paid to Enron’s top 200 executives, fueled by the exercise of soaring
stock options, went from $193 million to $1.4 billion—a sevenfold increase in the two years preceding
bankruptcy.  The top three executives, who were making mere tens of millions in 1998, earned more than
$100 million each in 2000.  And then, after, the stock price turned south in 2001, the company awarded
another $54 million in special bonuses to ‘retain’ key employees.  Is that illegal?  Well (gulp), I guess that’s
up to the jury in Houston to decide.  Is it obscene?  You bet.  The more you learn about what happened at
Enron, the harder it is to escape the conclusion that Messrs. Skilling and Lay and their compatriots were
looting the firm by pumping up the stock price and cashing in, all at the expense of shareholders and
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ernment authorities reacted vigorously.16  There were criminal prosecutions,17
regulatory investigations and enforcement actions,18 changes to SEC and self-
regulatory organization (“SRO”) regulation,19 and eventually, Sarbanes-Oxley,
which imposed new regulations on public companies.
At its core, therefore, Sarbanes-Oxley was an expression of social outrage at
misconduct by some members of the elite during the late 1990s.20  It is commonly
understood that a healthy, vibrant society cannot endure if its dominant mem-
bers, who are necessary for value creation because of their managerial, technical,
and financial expertise, take most of the value for themselves and pursue their
self-interest unchecked.21  Social norms exist to impose limits on this socially de-
structive behavior.
Sarbanes-Oxley was passed during a crisis after a significant fall in the
U.S. public capital markets,22 and its passage involved all kinds of political
horse-trading.23  The resulting legislation was imperfect—some parts were valu-
able and followed longstanding regulatory proposals, while others emerged in
employees.  It was their actions that prompted former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (one-
time winner of the Enron Prize for Distinguished Public Service) to coin the phrase ‘infectious greed.’ ”).
16. For example, former New York attorney general and governor, Eliot Spitzer, derived much political
“capital” from pursuing corporate and financial executives.  The reputation he gained as a result helped
him become elected governor.  Moreover, the reaction to the corporate scandals may have grown out of
revenge on the part of those who were displaced by people who became rich during the Internet boom.
This is reminiscent of the social upheavals among the financial elite in the 1980s.  For more on this view
of finance in the 1980s, in which establishment figures took revenge on “upstarts” who financed the
leveraged-buyout transactions, see DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY
MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1995).
17. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding criminal conviction of former
WorldCom chief executive officer Bernard Ebbers).
18. For example, investment banks, the SEC, and the New York attorney general entered into a settlement
regarding the banks’ practices of selling IPOs during the bubble years. See  SEC, VOLUNTARY INITIATIVE
REGARDING ALLOCATIONS OF SECURITIES IN “HOT” INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS TO CORPORATE EX-
ECUTIVES AND DIRECTORS, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/globalvolinit.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
19. These are discussed at length in FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY, supra note 1.  Several of
these changes will also be examined in more detail below.
20. Professor Faith Stevelman Kahn made a similar argument in Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule
of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1630–31 (2002).
21. Cf. ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS 146–58
(1999) (demonstrating that what is smart for the individual may not be advantageous for society).
22. Behavioral psychologists have shown that human beings are prone to certain biases that distort rational
decision making.  For example, immediately after a crisis, individuals may take action with respect to a
given event that has caused harm because the event has occurred recently and is vivid in everyone’s mind,
even though other harms that are less vivid are more deserving of attention and reform.  There is an
enormous literature on behavioral and psychological limitations on individuals and its implications for the
law. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
23. For example, since a main purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley was to regulate the accounting profession with
respect to its auditing of the financial statements of public companies, accounting firms lobbied to restrict
such regulation. See, e.g., Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Business Wins Its Battle to Ease a
Costly Sarbanes-Oxley Rule, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2006, at A1.
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reaction to certain scandals.24  Sarbanes-Oxley sent a symbolic message that the
excessive pursuit of self-interest was socially destructive.  It did this by reaffirm-
ing the need for professionalism in the capital markets, which is itself a social
value.
This article proceeds as follows.  Part II discusses the strength of and possible
reasons for the backlash against Sarbanes-Oxley.  Part III asserts the need for a
social defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, and provides a few examples of social benefits
of the legislation to public companies and broker-dealers.
II. THE PRECARIOUS POSITION OF SARBANES-OXLEY: THE BACKLASH
As had been the case with past legislation that regulated capital markets,
Sarbanes-Oxley encountered a backlash.25  Given the financial and political
strength of today’s executives and bankers, this backlash should not be surpris-
ing.26  There was a time when the managerial and financial elite was repre-
sented primarily by the Republican Party, while the Democratic Party would
regulate and restrain this dominant group.27  Today, however, both major politi-
cal parties have close ties to the elite, particularly its members in finance, such as
investment bankers, private equity partners, and hedge fund managers.28  To-
day, calls for rolling back Sarbanes-Oxley, or at least enacting sunset provisions
for the legislation,29 come from both sides of the aisle, with many vocal support-
24. The regulation of accountants would be in the former category, while the prohibition on a public corpora-
tion’s making loans to executives would be in the latter. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 402, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. IV 2004).  This prohibition was based upon WorldCom’s $0.5 billion loan to its
chief executive officer, Bernard Ebbers. See THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BD. OF DI-
RECTORS OF WORLDCOM, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 329–34 (2003).  WorldCom had assumed the
loans made to Ebbers by financial institutions where he pledged his WorldCom stock.  The company did
this to avoid the embarrassment of having the stock sold when it fell in value and when the financial
institutions, worried about the declining value of the stock as collateral, demanded repayment of the loans
or else they would sell the stock.
25. For a discussion of earlier backlashes, such as the original enactment of the federal securities laws, see
GEISST, supra note 6, at 196–243.
26. It often takes a monumental scandal to generate the social outrage necessary for politicians to put aside
concerns about their own campaign contributions and future employment and instead do something to
restrain the unacceptable conduct.
27. See GEISST, supra note 6, at 216–22.
28. One only has to witness the rush by Democratic candidates to tap the resources of financiers for campaign
contributions and the Democratic affiliation of many investment bankers and fund managers. See Brody
Mullins & Dean Treftz, Wall Street Antes Up for 2008, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2007, at A4.  Examples
of Democratic politicians with backgrounds in the financial industry include Jon Corzine, governor of the
state of New Jersey, and Robert Rubin, former secretary of the treasury under President Clinton.
29. Roberta Romano, professor of law at Yale Law School, has argued for sunset provisions on this and other
legislation. See Romano, supra note 2, at 1600–01.  I disagree and believe that her proposal would play
directly into the hands of business and financial circles.  If, in three or five years, legislation restraining
them were to expire, there would likely no longer exist the social outrage necessary to give Congress the
backbone to renew it.  Again, observe today the almost total absence of public outrage about stock-option
backdating, which is particularly egregious misbehavior.  It appears that social outrage cannot endure and
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ers, including SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, a former management lawyer
and business consultant.30  These circumstances indicate how difficult it is to reg-
ulate overreaching by executives and financiers.
The rapidity and intensity of the Sarbanes-Oxley backlash indicate a num-
ber of things.  First, it shows how powerful the members of the managerial and
financial elite have become and how unconcerned they are about any serious po-
litical threat to their dominance.31  They are now pursuing going-private trans-
actions and attempting to privatize the public securities markets32 without any
real threat of regulation being extended to this private world.33  All the while,
they maintain steady pressure on Congress and the SEC, through their defenders
in business and the law, to cut back on Sarbanes-Oxley and related regulations,
thereby giving themselves complete freedom to maneuver in companies and
finance.
Second, the rapidity and intensity of the backlash illustrate that the social
norms that triggered the reaction to the scandals, and thus Sarbanes-Oxley (and
that even resonate within members of the elite), have been significantly eroded
over the last three decades.34  This erosion has been due to the growing acceptance
of the self-interest ideology among executives, financiers, and even many mem-
bers of U.S. society.35  In other words, the dominant model of acceptable human
behavior in public corporations and the financial industry has become the indi-
vidual who pursues his or her profit maximization purely in a self-serving
way.36  Acceptance of this behavior signals the triumph of the financial model of
the human being, which presents people as rational profit seekers.  This model
can surface only from time to time, perhaps because it is tied to fundamental emotions that cannot be
sustained.  Moreover, in a perverse way, having sunset regulations might encourage extreme, overly
destructive regulation of business and finance (as we see in less stable democracies).  In addition, if the
political party dominating Congress knows that any legislation that it passes will eventually expire, its
members might be inclined to make it punitive for as long as it is operative.
30. For Atkins’s biography, see SEC, SEC BIOGRAPHY: COMMISSIONER PAUL S. ATKINS, http://www.sec.
gov/about/commissioner/atkins.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).  To get a sense of the deregulatory flavor
of a typical Atkins speech, see Paul S. Atkins, Comm’n, SEC, Remarks Before the Financial Services
Roundtable Lawyers Council 2007 Spring Meeting (May 10, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2007/spch051007psa.htm.
31. The one viable threat to them may come on the tax front, since there are proposals to change the tax laws
so that private equity funds pay a higher rate of tax than they currently do. See, e.g., The Blackstone
Tax, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2007, at A16.
32. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 3, at 34–38.
33. The last major threat of regulation was the SEC’s effort to require hedge funds to register as investment
advisers, which was struck down as beyond the SEC’s power. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
34. See Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices, 4
ACAD. MGT. LEARNING & EDUC. 75, 76–77 (2005).
35. Id.
36. See Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Corporate Governance for Crooks?  The Case for Corporate
Virtue 5-10 (Univ. of Zurich Inst. for Empirical Res. in Econ., Working Paper No. 164, 2003).
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emerged out of a fundamental opposition to totalitarian and socialist ideologies
that placed the social above the individual, particularly in economic activity.  In
the eyes of many, these ideologies, which triumphed during the period between
the two world wars, resulted in the economic destruction of the countries espous-
ing them.37
Under the anti-totalitarian model, society benefits (i.e., becomes wealthier
overall) when individuals unabashedly pursue their own self-interest and when
common programs established by government bureaucrats are rejected in favor of
market solutions.  This ideology of self-interest, which in public companies takes
the form of promoting shareholder value,38 was inculcated in the business stu-
dents who came of age in the 1980s and 1990s and who, of course, play major
roles in industry, finance, and business law today.39
All kinds of social norms—derived from religions, customs, and informal
codes of conduct—had held self-interested behavior among executives and finan-
ciers in check and had reinforced laws and regulations that placed outer bounds
upon and punished illegal or aberrant conduct in the capital markets.  Now that
these norms have been weakened, however, Sarbanes-Oxley cannot derive much
strength from social sources of support.40
Accordingly, to many executives and financiers, Sarbanes-Oxley seems to be
nothing more than inappropriate government interference with the private mar-
kets, which reflects efforts by politicians and regulators to advance their own self-
interest.  That many politicians persistently demand campaign contributions or
move to lobbying firms after they lose elections, and that many regulators leave
government service for investment banks, private equity funds, and law firms,
corroborates this cynical view of government regulation and public service.41
That is why Sarbanes-Oxley, perhaps more than earlier amendments to the
federal securities laws, is precarious and incomplete legislation.  It is precarious
37. A classic in this perspective is F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (50th anniversary ed. 1994). See
also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
38. See MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 175–98 (1998).  That is to
say, the public corporation is theorized to be governed ultimately for the benefit of shareholders, who are
portrayed in the theory to be concerned only about the maximization of profit in the firm. See generally
Daniel Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revis-
ited, 69 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996) (discussing how human shareholders are reduced to profit maxi-
mizers in the theory).
39. The self-interest ideology was inculcated because economics and finance assumed the place of honor in the
business school curriculum during the last half of the twentieth century. See Ghoshal, supra note 34, at
82–86.
40. Exceptions include individuals who were educated and trained outside the new self-interest model or who
espouse social values.
41. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has closely examined how “symbolic capital” obtained from education,
government service, and other sources can be “exchanged” for hard capital in the economy. See PIERRE
BOURDIEU, LA NOBLESSE D’ETAT (1989) (discussing how symbolic capital from school background is
transformed into economic power in France).
524
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because it lacks a strong social foundation to ensure that it will endure (although
at least the status quo bias and the difficulty of amending legislation protect it).42
It is incomplete for a different reason.  The assertion of the social interest against
the unbridled pursuit of self-interest was needed to counter the excesses of the
late-1990s.  But what is also necessary, as some business school educators have
asserted, is a fundamental reformation of the business school curriculum to offer
criticisms of, and alternatives to, the self-interest model (and its version in fi-
nance).43  In fact, given how widespread this model has become, the reform
would have to reach beyond business education into other academic fields, includ-
ing law and the social sciences.44
III. THE SOCIAL NEED FOR, AND EXAMPLES OF, THE DEFENSE OF SARBANES-
OXLEY
Changing the business and financial culture by moving it away from the
self-interest ideology will take time, and it may require a financial catastrophe to
upset the status quo and lead people to question the dominant perspective.  In the
meantime (and with the hope that no catastrophe occurs), if, as I observed above,
Sarbanes-Oxley symbolizes the social reaction to self-interest and promotes social
values in a concrete way, it merits defense for both its symbolic value and its
practical contributions.  This part of the article provides a few examples of how
42. See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation and Contract Law, in BEHAV-
IORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 22, at 116–43 (referring to the difficulty that people have moving
away from their present state of affairs).
43. See, e.g., Herbert Gintis & Rakesh Khurana, Corporate Honesty and Business Education: A Behav-
ioral Model 23–24 (2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=929173.  It is interesting that
even the “founder” of agency theory, Michael Jensen, arguably feels that the economic approach has been
taken too far in business organizations and has been used to justify excessive benefits for executives and
financiers. See Michael C. Jensen, Putting Integrity into Finance Theory and Practice (Harvard
NOM, Research Paper No. 06-06, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=876312.  Under agency
theory, the governance of firms is theorized in terms of the motivation and monitoring of executives as
self-interested profit seekers.  The classic work is Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
Professor Jensen is one of the most well-known scholars of finance and business organizations.  He is a
professor emeritus of business administration at the Harvard Business School.
44. Some efforts in this regard are occurring in the legal academy, such as the creation of an interdisciplinary
business law course that criticizes the self-interest model and provides alternative models to understanding
and governing firms. See  BROOKLYN LAW SCH.’S CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF LAW, LANGUAGE AND
COGNITION, THE BUSINESS FIRM AS SOCIAL ENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY COURSE, http://www.
brooklaw.edu/centers/cognition/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).  For a start, the reform would have to estab-
lish bases for professional conduct in companies and financial institutions other than the self-interest
model.  Just stating this so baldly brings home that this reform goes way beyond the regulation of public
companies and financial institutions and raises theoretical and practical problems of dealing with the issue
of changing social behavior through legislation and regulation.
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Sarbanes-Oxley furthers professionalism, a social value, which can counter the
excessive pursuit of self-interest in public companies and financial institutions.45
The first such example deals with reforms to the way that boards of directors
of public companies operate.  The board is at the apex of the corporate governance
of public companies, yet circumstances sometimes hinder directors’ abilities to ful-
fill their monitoring role.  Even though the law requires board members to act as
prudent people would in like circumstances,46 and best practices may impose even
greater responsibilities upon them, directors are busy people and, thus, are some-
times acquiescent in approving misconduct by senior executives (of course, direc-
tors are usually executives or former executives of other firms themselves).47  The
jurisprudence of the Delaware courts48 provides relatively low standards of con-
duct for directors except in certain contexts, such as situations of self-dealing and
acquisitions.49  Indeed, Delaware corporate law does not require corporate fiduci-
aries, such as directors, to behave in accordance with market expectations or prac-
tices, which would impose higher standards of conduct upon them.50
45. This is not to say that we cannot criticize Sarbanes-Oxley.  In previous articles written relatively soon
after its passage, I pointed out that the legislation did not go far enough in countering the excessive self-
interested behavior. See Fanto, Whistleblowing, supra note 1, at 524–37.  I have also argued that
Sarbanes-Oxley would have been more successful if it had been animated by the teachings of social psy-
chology and organization theory so as to have a solid intellectual basis with which to regulate destructive
social groups among the financial elite.  That said, my criticism was that the legislation did not go far
enough, although I felt that political circumstances would not allow Congress to supplement Sarbanes-
Oxley.  Although not a criticism per se, another article was designed to provide reform proposals related to
Sarbanes-Oxley that might be used in the future. See James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public
Company Management: Lessons from Bank Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 859 (2006) [hereinafter
Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation].
46. See  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2003).
47. For the background of directors, see SPENCER STUART, SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX: THE CHANGING
PROFILE OF DIRECTORS (2006), available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI-
2006.pdf.
48. Delaware corporate law is of key importance to directors because most public companies are incorporated
in Delaware, and thus, Delaware law governs directors’ responsibilities.
49. This is a large assertion, but would not be surprising to corporate law scholars.  To simplify matters
greatly, directors’ business decisions are not scrutinized by the courts, provided that the directors made an
appropriate (i.e., not grossly negligent) effort to make a decision. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858, 874–78 (Del. 1985) (illustrating a rare case in which directors were found to have acted in a grossly
negligent manner).  As all students of corporations know, courts impose heightened standards of scrutiny
when a director engages in a self-interested transaction with the company. See, e.g., Hollinger Int’l Inc.
v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1061–62 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005).  Courts also do so
when directors take defensive measures in the face of a hostile offer for their company. See Unocal v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
50. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27
(Del. 2006).  In this case, which dealt with a challenge to the Walt Disney Company’s (“Disney”) board of
directors and its board compensation committee in their approval of the hiring and release of Disney
president, Michael Ovitz, the court admitted that Delaware law imposes lesser standards of conduct upon
directors than what the market understands to be best practices of directors.  “[T]he best practices of corpo-
rate governance include compliance with fiduciary duties.  Compliance with fiduciary duties, however, is
not always enough to meet or to satisfy what is expected by the best practices of corporate governance.” Id.
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By contrast, Sarbanes-Oxley sought to change directors’ conduct by making
them act as independent supervisors of the senior executives and the firm.  Be-
cause of Sarbanes-Oxley, federal securities law now imposes higher standards of
conduct on directors than does Delaware corporate law.51  In accordance with the
way federal securities laws generally operate, Sarbanes-Oxley imposed higher
standards in two respects: (1) it addressed the situation through SEC and SRO
regulation, and (2) it gave the SEC and federal prosecutors the tools to restrict
and punish misconduct.
First, it directed the SEC to impose, or to tell the SROs, such as stock ex-
changes,52 to impose, rules of conduct upon directors of public companies.  In ef-
fect, the legislation transformed directors into professionals, with “profession”
understood to mean a group that is devoted to standards of knowledge and con-
duct and that performs work that is socially beneficial (in this case, the supervi-
sion of public companies in a way that produces wealth for all participants, not
just senior executives), even if the profession advances the social position of its
members as well.  Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, directed the audit committee of
the board to become an independent, formal (with a charter and defined duties),
and financially sophisticated source of power to counter the dominance of the
senior executives.53  Importantly, the audit committee, rather than the senior ex-
ecutives, now gives directions to the outside auditing firm, which in turn is insu-
lated from pressure from executives who might engage in fraud.54  The audit
committee also became the recipient of anonymous complaints (i.e., whistleblow-
ing), which are important in public corporations because employees and even
senior executives must often make complaints anonymously if they expect to sur-
vive at the company.55
The board professionalism spurred on by Sarbanes-Oxley affected other
committees of the board as well, even though the legislation did not directly ad-
dress them.  For instance, the audit committee was used as a model for the board
nominating committee, which became the gatekeeper to, standard setter for, and
evaluator of the board.  As a result, members of the board nominating committee
51. Others have made this point. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives
‘Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels’: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies and the Debate
over Entity versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
52. Public companies that are listed on stock exchanges must follow stock exchange governance rules, which
must be approved by the SEC.  Thus, regulation of directors under the federal securities laws could come
from various sources, including legislation, SEC rules, or stock exchange rules.
53. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 204, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(k) (Supp. IV 2004) (setting standards for audit
committees of public companies); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2007) (requiring the SEC to make sure
that public companies that did not meet these standards could not be listed on the stock exchanges). See
generally FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY, supra note 1, §§ 3-13–3-41 (discussing
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley related to the audit committee, as well as SEC and SRO rules).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(k).
55. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(3)(ii).
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have a real responsibility and are not simply to rubber-stamp the chief executive
officer’s (“CEO”) selections of directors.56  By its rules, the SEC indirectly sup-
ported this committee’s independence from the senior executives; that is, it re-
quired a company to disclose how the board nominating committee conducts the
director nomination process.57
The same pattern of professionalism spread to the board’s compensation com-
mittee, which determined the CEO’s compensation in order to obtain his or her
best possible performance.58  The compensation committee became more formal
via the requirements of a committee charter, it oversaw compensation consul-
tants, who advised on appropriate compensation packages for CEOs,59 and its
operational methods became more transparent due to enhanced SEC disclosure
requirements.60
The second classic move in federal securities regulation is punitive: prohibit-
ing improper practices or restricting a party’s freedom of action to prevent that
party from engaging in future misconduct.  Sarbanes-Oxley adopted a particu-
larly harsh approach toward senior executives to stop them from engaging in the
questionable practices of the bubble years.  In the auditing context, it imposed a
certification requirement that forced CEOs and the chief financial officers
(“CFOs”) of publicly traded companies to certify the material accuracy of their
financial statements and the adequacy of their internal procedures (known as
“internal controls”) for generating these statements.61  It also provided for civil
56. See generally NYSE EURONEXT, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.04 (2007), available at http://
www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=http://www.nyse.com/lcm/1078416930891.html?archive=
no. See also NASDAQ, MARKETPLACE RULES § 4350(c)(4) (2007), available at http://www.complinet.
com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=13.
57. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2).
58. The reforms to this committee, as to the nominating committee, were not mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley,
but rather were the subject of SRO rules modeled on those of the audit committee. See id; see also id.
§ 229.402(b).
59. See generally NYSE EURONEXT, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05, available at http://www.
nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=http://www.nyse.com/lcm/1078416930891.html?archive=no;
NASDAQ, MARKETPLACE RULES § 4350(c)(3), available at http://www.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/
display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=13.
60. SEC disclosure of executive compensation in public companies predates Sarbanes-Oxley.  That is, execu-
tive compensation is Item 14 of Schedule A, which was attached to the Securities Act of 1933 to provide a
model for the required disclosure when a company goes public.  In fact, the SEC recently revealed its
dissatisfaction with performances of the compensation committee in public companies when it replaced
that committee’s report on executive compensation with the annual Compensation Discussion and Analy-
sis. See  17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b).
61. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. IV 2004) (requiring the SEC, by rule, to
establish the appropriate certification); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a) (Supp. IV
2004) (requiring CEOs and CFOs to provide written statements certifying financial reports); see also 17
C.F.R. § 240.13a-14.  In addition, in the auditing context, executives, among others, shall be punished
for retaliating against whistleblowers (who, as noted above, report to the audit committee). See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. IV 2004).
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and criminal liability if the executives made misleading or false certifications.62
Because of Sarbanes-Oxley, executives are no longer free to let their underlings
conduct fraudulent activities with respect to financial statements and then assert
that they had no direct knowledge of the fraud, all the while profiting from it.
They are now directly responsible for the financial statements and the processes
that produce them.63
Sarbanes-Oxley took a similar punitive approach toward executives in the
compensation area, essentially to punish them if fraud occurred under their
watch.  It gave the SEC the power to freeze and recapture executive bonuses and
profits from the sale of shares received within the twelve months following a
company’s financial report that later had to be restated because of misconduct in
the firm.64  The SEC was also given the power to petition a court to freeze any
“extraordinary payments” to executives if, in the course of an investigation, the
SEC discovered evidence of a violation of federal securities laws.65  In addition,
the legislation essentially banned public companies from making loans to their
executives.66
Sarbanes-Oxley took a similar reformation strategy with respect to finan-
ciers.  The most salient example of promoting professionalism among financiers is
the regulation of research analysts in broker-dealers.  Analysts contributed to the
corporate scandals in the following manner: bankers would win mandates for
IPOs of the hot technology companies and other investment banking business by
promising favorable coverage of the IPO companies by their research analysts
(and by having analysts themselves promise such to obtain the mandates).67  This
positive coverage from the analysts would help insiders and executives because
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (providing for criminal penalties); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 303, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7242 (Supp. IV 2004) (providing for civil penalties).
63. Admittedly, there have been problems implementing these requirements. See COMM. ON CAPITAL
MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 3, at 131 (recommending modifications to the regulatory implementa-
tion of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004). Yet the emphasis on
management’s responsibility for internal financial controls may be justified by the large number of finan-
cial restatements made by public companies even after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS 4 (2006) (pointing out that there were 1,390 restate-
ments involving 1,084 public companies from the beginning of 2002 through September 2005).
64. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (Supp. IV 2004).  The need for a financial
restatement might be caused by fraud, misrepresentation, or an accounting error.
65. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1103, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)(3) (Supp. IV 2004).
66. See supra note 24.  Sarbanes-Oxley also gave the SEC new enforcement powers, which, in some cases,
allowed the SEC to seek to impose in administrative proceedings certain penalties (such as barring an
officer or director from future service in public companies) that it could formerly only ask from a court.
See Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation, supra note 45, at 890–95 (discussing these powers).
67. For a general discussion of the abuses, see JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 245–82 (2006); NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMM., REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS OF A COMMITTEE CONVENED BY THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. AND NASD
AT THE REQUEST OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1–2 (2003).
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later, right before the expiration of the lock-up agreement,68 the analysts would
release a favorable research report (a “booster shot”) about the company.69  Once
the company had been in the public markets for some time (i.e., it is a “seasoned
company”), the analysts would help executives and other insiders by maintaining
a favorable rating on the stock, allowing the executives to sell their stock at a
high price (or pledge the stock) at their convenience.  Analysts amplified the bub-
ble by touting the future of technology companies that they knew would probably
fail and by not revealing the questionable activities of seasoned companies, like
WorldCom and Enron, that eventually collapsed because of scandals.70
Through Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress added Section 15D to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, which addressed research analyst conflicts of interest with
respect to equity securities.71  The thrust of Section 15D was to separate research
analysts from investment bankers and insulate the analysts from the bankers’
salesmanship pressure.  It also bolstered the SEC and SRO regulation of research
analysts, which was the result of the New York attorney general’s and the SEC’s
investigations.72  Independently of Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, the SEC
promulgated Regulation AC, which, among other things, requires an analyst to
certify his or her belief in the research recommendation.73
Under these reforms, research analysts are now walled-off from investment
banking and told to be objective as to the proper valuation of companies.  In a
sense, analysts are asked to be professionals, rather than self-interested salespe-
ople.  As professionals, the analysts fulfill a social purpose: namely, to help inves-
tors in the securities markets arrive at the best available valuations of
68. A lock-up agreement is a contract between the underwriters and the insiders of a company that prohibits
the insiders from selling their shares of stock for a specified period.
69. Typically, in an IPO, the underwriter “locks-up” the insiders’ securities for one hundred eighty days
following the offering.  If the insiders sold their shares right after the offering, such sales would put selling
pressure on the stock and send a negative signal to the market, which would lower its price.  Purchasers in
the IPO would be unhappy to watch the stock price fall.  At the expiration of the lock-up, insiders may sell
some of their shares, and they would appreciate having an analyst issue a favorable report on their
company at or near this time.
70. This is all detailed in the New York attorney general’s report on financial institutions’ misconduct in
IPOs.  To take one well-known example, Jack Grubman, a former analyst for Salomon Smith Barney,
attended WorldCom board meetings and altered his valuation model for the company so that he could
continue to recommend it as a “buy.” See In re WorldCom, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 403–05 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).  This was because, among other reasons, Salomon did a large amount of investment banking work
for WorldCom.
71. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 501, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (Supp. IV 2004).
72. NASD R. 2711 (2006); see NYSE R. 472(b) (2006); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes
to Amend NYSE Rules Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, 72 Fed. Reg. 2059 (Jan. 17,
2007) (proposing rules following the direction of Sarbanes-Oxley).
73. See Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 9193, 68 Fed. Reg. 9482 (Feb. 27,
2003); 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(1) (2007).
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companies.74  Thus, under the SRO rules, research analysts cannot market a
transaction, solicit business from an issuer, participate in road shows, or accom-
pany company executives and investment bankers in their visits to investors.75
The analysts’ compensation cannot be based on specific transactions or be deter-
mined by investment bankers.76
The regulation of analysts even has a punitive aspect similar to that seen in
the regulation of the board.  The analysts must certify as to their belief in the
research opinion and can be punished civilly and criminally for providing inten-
tionally misleading research, which would violate the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws.77
However, the reform of investment banks, as exemplified by the regulation
of research analysts, was incomplete.  While it reinforced the professionalism of
the public faces of the banks (i.e., the analysts), it mainly neglected to do the same
for the less-public investment bankers, who found the deals, and the brokers, who
sold them to investors.78  A complete professional reform may have been needed
for investment banks because many of the financial institutions involved in the
scandals were financial holding companies created after the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933,79 a change that allowed commercial banks to join with
investment banks in forming financial conglomerates.  These financial conglom-
erates were punished for their involvement in corporate scandals and some of
74. This has the effect of directing investors’ funds toward deserving firms and away from firms that un-
derperform, which arguably makes for a rational allocation of resources.
75. See NYSE R. 472(b)(5)–(6); NASD R. 2711(c).  There are all kinds of qualifications to these restrictions
that are not significant for the discussion.  For example, after the investment bank has received an IPO
mandate an analyst may discuss pricing information with investment bankers, participate in due diligence
of the company, and talk with investors separately and educate the broker-dealer’s sales force, provided
that the discussion is “balanced.”
76. See NYSE R. 472(h); NASD R. 2711(d).  Research analysts also have personal trading restrictions: an
analyst is not allowed to purchase securities of private companies in the same line of business as that
covered by the analyst; there is a blackout period for purchases or sales of company securities by the analyst
around the release of a research report; and the analyst is prohibited from trading against his or her
recommendation in the report. See NYSE R. 472(e)–(f)(4); NASD R. 2711(f)(4)–(g).  These rules are
subject to detailed exceptions.
77. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
78. The only regulation of the investment bankers and brokers has been to stop them from engaging in specific
abusive IPO practices used during the late-1990s. See 1 NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BRO-
KER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §§ 13-62–13-69 (4th ed. 2007).
79. See Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 20, 48 Stat. 188, repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 16 and 18 U.S.C.).
To simplify things, Glass-Steagall separated investment banks from commercial banks, although this sepa-
ration was somewhat eroded over the years by banking authorities responding to the needs of banks to
expand their powers and affiliations.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley ended the separation and, among other
things, allowed commercial banks to be in a group (a financial holding company) with an investment bank
as an affiliate.
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their dysfunctional internal procedures were corrected in settlement agreements.80
Their involvement in the scandals occurred despite the fact that banking institu-
tions had historically been subject to more extensive regulation than public com-
panies or even investment banks.  Moreover, at least in commercial banking,
there has historically been a strong sense of professionalism among bankers.  As
the boundaries between financial institutions continue to blur, however, and the
competition among them heightens, professionalism remains in need of regulatory
and legislative support to reach all kinds of financial personnel, not just research
analysts.81
IV. CONCLUSION
My message and conclusion are straightforward.  Sarbanes-Oxley and its
backlash repeat a historical pattern: regulation of executives and financiers fol-
lowed by a strong resistance to the regulation based on predictions of dire finan-
cial consequences and damage to the economy if the legislation is not reversed or
at least weakened.
In this article, I have argued that the scandals leading to Sarbanes-Oxley
and the resulting rapid and powerful backlash arose because of the prevalence of
the self-interest ideology in business, finance, and indeed, U.S. society, which
views individuals solely as profit-maximizers.
Sarbanes-Oxley is fundamentally a reassertion of social values against the
socially destructive aspects of the self-interest ideology.  I have provided several
examples of the law’s social orientation, which require professionalism in the
boards of directors of public companies and in the research analysts in investment
banks.  Changing the ideology of executives and financiers will likely require
more than the legal reforms offered by Sarbanes-Oxley.  Yet, this law’s contribu-
tion to an alternative, more pro-social perspective and its practical reforms are
grounds for its defense.
80. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., WRITTEN AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN
CITIGROUP INC. & FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK (2003), available at http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2003/20030728/attachment.pdf.  For a general discussion of
this subject, see James A. Fanto, Subtle Hazards Revisited: The Corruption of a Financial Holding
Company by a Corporate Client’s Inner Circle, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 7 (2004).
81. There has been a backlash to regulations of investment banks just as occurred with respect to public
companies.  Moreover, some of the key reforms to the NASD rules dealing with the most egregious IPO
abuses by investment bankers have not yet been finalized. See Proposed NASD Rule 2712, Form 19b-4
Proposed Rule Change by NASD (Sept. 15, 2003).  The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”) is the new SRO that combines the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange’s member regu-
lation, enforcement, and arbitration departments.  This consolidation will give broker-dealers one SRO,
rather than multiple ones, as a governing body.
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